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OF MARSILIUS OF PADUA AND WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: 
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JANET COLEMAN 
This paper attempts te demensfrate twe thèses: the mere explicit 
thesis is that beth MarsiUus of Padua and WUUam ef Ockham, come te 
thefr conclusiens about the reason fer, the nature ef, and the extent ef 
legitimate seciUar power fri men's Uves frem the same premise: that men's 
sensual experience ef Uvfrig life is the necessary first cenditien frem which 
aU subsequent ratienal conclusiens about pelitics emerge. 
Secendly, this paper attempts te compare and centiast seme ef the 
fundamental tenets ef MarsUius and Ockham en severeign power and its 
source, with an eye frained on the contfriuity ef politicai disceurse frem 
the late middle ages imtil the seventeenth century and beyend. EspeciaUy 
in the Anglo-American werld, medievalists tend te talk only te ene 
another. Early moderrrists have long resisted, imtU quite recentìy, any 
suggestien that what medieval politicai theorists had te say about 
legitimate sovereignty, its source and extent, dfrectìy fed inte these 17th 
and 18th century peUtical thèeries which are taken te be new beginnings 
of our ewn modem ideas ef the legitimate state. Hence, the secend, mere 
mipUcit thesis ef this paper is that a knewledge ef Ockham prepares a 
leader for Hobbes, and a knewledge ef MarsiUus ef Padua prepares a 
reader fer certam preminent aspects of the thèeries ef Locke and Rousseau. 
Ockham argued that the function ef temperai rulers was te chastise 
and punisti wrengdoers in society and te defend the church frem them. 
Although the church has exclusive spfritual power it is subject te lay 
rulers with regard te the church's preperties. Since men whe cemprise 
societies are themselves beth spfritual and temperai bemgs there are twe 
distinct erders, temperai and spiritual, which erder human Uves. Ockham's 
primary focus is en the nature ef men as fridividuals and he is cencemed 
lo show hew individuai men have certain Uberties as a consèquence ef 
God's crèation se that they can never cempletely aUenate certaUi naturaUy 
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possessed mdividual Uberties te either state er church. In beth the spiritual 
as weU as the temperai spheres ef human life the individuai must be 
considered first as te his rights, capacities and Uberties. Frem an analysis 
ef the individuai we can then proceed te cellectiens ef individuais 
cemprising groups er secieties. Hence, in Christian society, Ockham 
believes that the spiritual and temperai pewers embrace the same 
individuais whe are beth baptised members ef the church AND subjects 
ef temperai rulers as citizens. When we speak abeut individuai men we 
are dealing with individuais. 
Whe have already in thefr very natures a spfritual and temperai 
aspect and questions pertafriing te gevemance derive frem the prior 
dèfinition ef the composite individuai whe, pre statu iste, is subject beth 
te spiritual and temperai rules whUe he Uves out his mortai life< \̂ 
This focus en the individuai is a consèquence ef what is often, 
perhaps misleadingly, called Ockham's nominalism. In discussing what 
appears te have been his final position'^^ en hew humans come te knew 
what can be knev^m in the erdinary course ef Uved life, it is more accurate 
te refer te him as a cenceptualist<^\ Whatever we cali his epistemelogy, 
Ockham beUeved that aU there is in the werld are centingent individuais 
and human beings then apply names, nomina, te such present and existing 
individuais which they knew as a result ef intuitive cegnitien. Thereafter, 
they construct sentences er propesitions either in thought er in 
cenventienal language by which they refer te the fridividuaUty ef the 
werld''*^ 
'̂ ) Octe quaestiones de potestate pape. Opera Polìtica, I ed. H.S. Offler 
(Manchester, 1974), 1,4 and passim. 
'̂ ) His fmal pesitien is made clear, (After W. Chatton's attack on bis earlier 
pesitien) fri tìie Quedlìbets the Quaestiones in libres physicerum (e. 1333). hi 
the Ordinatìo = I Sent. (1317-23) we fmd the earlier fictum theery (alse feund in 
the Reportatienes, II-IV Sent) side by side with the inteUectie theory without a 
cheice being made. 
'3) His cenceptuaUsm may be expressed as foUows: universals are nothing 
other than names, that is, naturaUy significant general concepts, primarily, or 
secendarily, the cenventienal (linguìstic) signs correspondmg te primary natiiral 
signs (concepts). 
'*̂  Quod. V, q. 8 a.l. (Opera philosophìca et Theolegica, Opera Theolegica, 
IX, Quedlibeta Septem, ed. Joseph C Wey, C.S.B. (St Bonaventìire, N.Y., 1980) 
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Ockham believed that humans naturaUy have an immediate an 
intuitive knewledge of the existence and présence ef individuai, centingent 
objects^^^ We cannet legicaUy demenstrate this intuitive knewledge of 
things but we simply experience it as a fact ef life. NermaUy we knew 
singulars that exist eutside the mind and in the werld through sense 
experience ef their present existence, and thereafter, we knew them 
intellectually as mere universal concepts er mental names'*^ The 
p. 509. Circa primum dice qued sicut terminerum vocalium et scriptorum 
quaedam sunt nomina, quaedam verba, quaedam pronemina, quaedam 
participia... adverbia... ceniunctienes,... praepositienes, sic conceptum 
mentalium quidam cenceptus sunt nomina, quidam verba ...ceniunctienes 
...praepositienes. Quod patet ex hec quod omni erationi vocali verae et falsae 
correspendet aliqua prepesitìo mentalis composita ex cenceptibus; igitur sicut 
partes propositìonis vecalis quae imponuntur ad significandum res, prepter 
necessita tem significatìonis vel expressienis, ...sunt distinctae partes, sic partes 
propositìonis mentalis correspendentes vecibus sunt distìnctae ad faciendum 
distinctas propositienes veras et falsas. 
Qued. I q. 13 a.2 cenclusie: ...dice tunc primo quod singulare praedicta 
modo acceptum cognitìone sibi prepria et simplici est prime cognitum. Qued 
probatur, quia res extra animam quae nen est signum, tali cognitiene primo 
intelligitur; sed emnis res extta animam est singularis ...nihil autem praecidit 
talem actum nisi singulare. pp. 72-3. 
'5) Prelegue, Sent. Q. 1, Z (Opera Theolegica, I, p. 28 f): qued respectu 
incomplexi (=terms) petest esse duplex netitia, quarum una potest vecari 
absttactìva et alia intuitìva. Qued.I. q. 13 cenclusie 2: Secvmde, dico quod cognitìo 
simplex prepria sìngulari et prima tali primitate est cognitìo intuitìva. Quod 
autem ista cognitìo sit prima patet, quia cognitìo singularis abstractiva 
praesuppenit intuitìva respectu eiusdem obiecti et nen e converso. Quod autem 
sit propria sìngulari patet, quia immediate causatur a re sìngulari vel nata est 
causari, et nen est causari ab alia re sìngulari etìam eiusdem speciei. p. 73. 
Quod. Ill.q. 12 a.2: ...quod prepesitio mentaUs nen compenitur ex rebus extta 
animam sed ex cenceptibus, (citing Boethius, In librum perihennenias, 2,1. e. de 
signis: oratìe nen habet nisi ttiplex esse, scilicet in mente, in vece et in scripte), 
p. 247. 
'̂ ' ...nihU praecedit actum intelUgendi nisi smgulare. Exp. Phys. Lib. I, 
cited in Jurgen Miethke, Ockhams Weg zur Sezialphilosephie (Berlin, 1969) p. 
205 n. 245. 
Quod. V. q.5 ad instantiam 1: nam cognitìo evidens ùnportat quod ista sit in 
re sicut denotatur per prepositìonem cui fit assensus; et per consequens cum 
cognitìo evidens huius propesitionis 'res est praesens' impertat rem esse 
praesentem, eportet qued res sit praesens aliter nen erit cognitio evidens. p. 
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universal concepì er thought is a naturai sign m the mind desented as an 
act ef thinkmg, which signifies semething fer which it substitutes. Concepts 
are the basic cempenents ef eur tìùnkfrig but they are caused by prior 
existent, extramental things. UniversaUty and commenaUty are net, 
therefere, preperties ef exframental, particular thfrigs but ef signs er terms, 
be they acts ef thought er linguìstic expressiens. When a sign er term is a 
concepì it is an act of knowfrig which signifies individuais knewn. 
A sign er term may alse be cenventienally established, as is 
language, and it cerresponds te the naturai signs er mental concepts 
which signify the individuai thing sensually experienced'^. Ockham 
insists en the ene band that what we knew ef the werld had ffrst te be 
sensuaUy experienced^^^ but en the other, he insists that no extemal 
498. Qued. I. q. 14: Utrum intellectus noster prò statu iste cognoscat actus sues 
intuitive.... Item cognitìo experimentalis non est sine notìtìa intuitìva; sed aUquos 
carens omnia notìtìa intuitìva sensitìva experitur cognitìonem intellectualem. 
Quod. I. q. 15: Utrum intellectus noster pre statu iste cognoscat intuitive 
sensibUia... quod sic, quia inteUectus cognoscit evidenter prepositìonem primam 
centingentem de sensibilibus; igitur habet notìtiam incemplexam sufficientem 
ad causandum notìtiam illam complexam evidenter; sed absttactiva sensibilium 
nen sufficit, p. 83. 
Summa tetius Logiae, III, ii, e. 29: ...iste est precessus, qued prime homo 
cogniscitur alique sensu particulari, deinde idem home cegnoscitur ab intellectu, 
que cognite habetur una netitia generalis et cemmunis omni homini. 
Ms Berlin, lat. 2041 foi. 98 va: Exp. Aur. Lib. I (as cited in Miethke, pp. 196-
7, n. 208a): Universale est netius apud ratìonem et singulare apud sensum, hoc 
est: universale est netìus per inteUectum, nen per sensum, et particulare est 
notum per sensum et nen universale. Et universale sic est netìus apud inteUectum 
sive res sit, sive nen sit: sed partìculare nen est notum sensui nis quando res 
est, et pre tanto dicatur universale netìus apud inteUectum quam smgulare, 
singulare autem est netìus apud sensum vel quia tantum partìculare cegnoscitur 
a sensu, nen universale, vel quia prius tempere vel natura est partìculare notum 
sensui quam intellectui. 
'^ Quod. III, q. 12, a.l: ...quìa cuilibet cemplexioni in vece correspendet 
aliqua cemplexie in mente. 
'«) Prelegue, Sent. Q. 2, G (Opera Theolegica, I, pp. 86 f): Sicut ponatìir 
qued hec sit prUnum principium: 'emnis herba talis specìei confert febricitantì'. 
Ista per nuUas propositienes netìores petest syllogizari, sed eius notìtìa accipitur 
ex notìtìa intuitìva forte multorum. Quia enim iste vidit quod post cemestionem 
talis herbae sequebatur sanìtas in febricitante, et amevit omnes aUas causas 
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corporeal substance can be naturaUy apprehended by us in itself We only 
knew particular and individuai substances which exist, through mental, 
spoken er written propesitions cemprised ef signs er terms which 
substitute fer er suppesit fer exframental things experienced''). Hence we 
gel his famous statement that eur knewledge in experience derives frem 
terms which suppesit fer exframental thfrigs. But the starting poUit of any 
knewledge ef centingent facts is intuitive cegnitien ef terms which 
cemprise a mental er Imguistic prepositien. By this he means that m the 
naturai course ef Uving we have an immediate awareness or apprehension 
of terms which substitute fer the really existing and present things we 
have sensed and which themselves, as individuais existing and present, 
are net signs^^"^ Frem the pure apperception ef individuais and the linking 
of such through propesitions whese terms substitute fer them, cemes 
meaning. Hence eur knewledge is ef propesitions whese terms substitute 
for our experiences; and prepositienal logie, appUed te spoken, written 
and mental sign systems enables us te knew the truth abeut the werld as 
it ordinarily is fer us new and as it was in the past. We are, then, as 
certain ef eur experiences as we can be ef anything. Ockham is net saying 
that the knewledge we have, initially caused by the intuitive cegnitien ef 
terms referring te eur experiences, necessarily mirrors seme inner 
sanitatìs illius, scivit evidenter quod ista herba fuit causa sanìtas; et tunc habet 
experimentum de sìngulari. Est autem, sibi notum quod omnia individua 
eiusdem ratìonis habent effectus eiusdem ratìonis in passe aequaliter dispesito. 
Et ideo evidenter accipit tanquam principium, quod emnis talis herba confert 
febricitantì. 
'') Scientìa realis nen est de rebus sed est de intentìonibus suppertìbus 
prò rebus quia termini propositìonum scitarum suppenunt prò rebus.... solae 
propositìones sciuntur. See I Sent. d. 2. q. 4. 
'̂ '') Qued. IV, 19: stticte dicitur mtentie prima nemen mentale praecise 
natum esse exttemum propositìonis et supponere pre re, quae non est signum. 
Summa Logica I, 12 (ed. Boehner, pp. 39f): Intentìe est quoddam in anima, 
quod est signum naturaliter significans aliquid pre quo potest supponere, vel 
quod potest esse pars propositìonis mentalis. 
Qued. V. q. 5 ad instantiam 1. 
Quod. V. q. 6: Uttum actus apprehendendi et actus iudicandi differant 
realiter. p. 500 f a.2 cenclusie 1:. ...actus assentìendi uttaque mode acceptus 
differt a prima apprehensione... actus apprehensivus causat actum iudicatìvum. 
(p.502). 
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censtitution ef natiare "eut tìiere". Rather, he frisists we sfrnply have a 
cenfidence fri what we have experienced and frem here we can only 
assume, as we aU de, that there is a hypethetical necessity cenfirmfrig 
that eur thoughts er universal concepts adequately reflect the physical 
werld ef particulars. Our thèeries abeut the werld, pre statu iste, can 
only be about mental concepts thought te be cemmenly applicable lo 
centfrigent and cermptible tìifrigs m the werld, such concepts suppesiting 
for experienced things m mental and spoken disceurse. Frem eur intuitive 
cegnitien ef the singular we necessarily use eur naturai reason te generalise 
te ali other cases or individuais ef a similar nature. Hence, we come by 
induction, te a mental and Ifriguistic disceurse abeut hew the werld is for 
US. 
Scattered threughout Ockham's varieus writings, en Aristotìe's 
Physics, en logie, en theology in his commentary en the Sentences, and in 
his pelemical writings against papal pretensions te a plenitude ef power, 
he repeats that there are three sources ef knewledge: experience, naturai 
reason and UifalUble scriptural autherity'"^ The erder, se far as I have been 
able te discever, is always the same: experience, reason and scripture. 
Hence, a precess appears te emerge which reflects his epistemelogy 
whereby experience precedes everything te which is applied naturai 
reason, and beth tegether enable us te confirm seme ef eur beliefs in the 
fruth ef scriptural authority by ratienally demenstrating them te be 
understandable and therefere demensfrably true as weU as beUeved'̂ ^l This 
precess ef experience, naturai reason and logicai demonstratien, and 
scriptural authority can, I think, be shown te operate similarly in MarsUius 
of Padua's Defensor Pacis. 
In the past, schelars have thought that the peUtical writings of 
Ockham have very little te de with his logicai and philosophical and 
(11) This is what is knewn as Ockham's razer: 'pluralitas nen est ponenda 
sine necessitate' valet quando ad prebandum talem pluralitatem nen habetur 
experientia certa, sive ratio naturalem vel aucteritas infaUibilis. See I Sent. d. 30 
q. 1 E and Quaest. Phys. 
<̂ )̂ There are, ef course, scriptural truths (credibiUa) which cannet be 
cenfirmed by demenstiatien and must be believed; these, per rationem puram 
naturalem prebari nen potest. Opus nonaginta dierum. Opera Politica. II (ed. 
Offler) e. 65, p. 575. 
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even theelegical writings ef the ffrst peried in his life at Oxferd'^^). This is 
net Ime. In fact, as an excellent legician whe wrete cemmentaries on 
many ef Aristotle's logicai writings, Ockham develeped net only an 
epistemelogy but related te this, a theery about hew we interpret language 
in erdinary cases as we Uve Ufe and cemmunicate with other men. He 
then appUed this te hew we can interpret the texts ef Scripture. This had 
enormeus censèquences fer the way he friterprets the rightful relè ef the 
papacy and if we understand hew he thinks human beings interpret any 
texts, be they hely scripture er politicai pamphlets, we can see that he has 
an explesive theery which would take away frem the papacy and the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy the sole right te interpret the werds ef Ged. He 
thinks that anyone whe experiences the werld and draws conclusiens 
from that experiences se long as he is sane and Uterate, can alse interpret 
God's werds in scripture. In his politicai writings he spends virtually aU 
his time shewing h e w the papacy has misinterpreted scripture 
iUegitimately and illogically te suit its ewn case^^*\ We can knew God's 
fritention as weil as, if net better than, the papacy and hence, scripture 
teUs US, if we read it preperly as we read any text, just what kfrids of 
jurisdictienal power Christ gave te Peter in the spiritual governance of 
the werld. 
Ockham say'̂ ^^ that Scripture tells us, and St. Francis, the feunder 
<") John Morrall, 'Seme notes en a recent interpretation ef William ef 
Ockham's politicai phUosephy', Franciscan Studies 9 (1949) pp. 335-69; Ph. 
Boehner, 'Ockham's politicai ideas', in CoUected Articles on Ockham, ed. E. M. 
Buytaert (N.Y and Louvain, 1958) pp. 442-68; Gordon Leff, Wflliam ef Ockham, 
the metamerphosis of schelastic disceurse, (Manchester, 1975) ch.lO, pp. 614-
16. But see Jiirgen Miethke, Vorwert, pp. xi-xvi, m Ockhams Weg, fer a thorough 
correctìve te this view. Alse Die ebjektivierende Mèthede, pp. 430 f. 
The break in Ockham's career was centingent. He was a Franciscan involved 
in the peverty debate of his Order beth at Oxford and after he left. His methed 
of analysing texts was develeped and endured threughout his life. Ockham did 
not deal with pelitìcal issues only as a commentator en Aristotìe's Pelitìcs and 
Ethics, but primarily as a Franciscan ùivolved in his Order's peverty dispute 
with the papacy. See Miethke, pp. 443 f. Alse see Janet Coleman, 'The relatìen 
between Ockham's intuitive cegnitien and his politicai science' in Thèolegie et 
droit dans la science poUtique de l'Etat moderne, ed. F. C. Uginet, École Frangaise 
de Rome, (forthcoming). 
'"̂  See Miethke, p. 430, citmg frem the Opus nonaginta dierum. 
'") In what is probably the first werk written m the secend part ef his life 
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ef his Order understeed this perfectly, that Christ and his apestìes only 
used what was necessary te sustain Ufe. Christ and the apestìes did not 
ewn things, they simply used the werld te Uve. Hence, men have a naturai 
right ef use ef tìifrigs m the werld, rather than ewnership er pessession of 
necessities — a right of use given us by Ged te stay alive. This naturai 
right ef use came befere aU subsequent legai er positive rights ef pessession 
which men, fri cemmunities, then estabUshed. Ov^mership and pessession 
in secieties ef men is a result of the Fall. We come up with positive laws 
er rules which determine whe ewns what because we are new faUen 
creatures, end we express these rights ef ewnership Ui man-made positive 
laws. But the ideal of spfritual perfection, befere the faU, is expressed by 
the naturai law in us which lets us knew as the result of experience and 
frituitien ef what there is te be experienced and knov^m, that we have a 
Ged — given right te survive in the werld and te use the werld far that 
survival without saying that we ewn the werld er any part ef it. Only 
Ged has rightful ewnership er deminium ef the werld. Since faUen men, 
fer utilitarian purpeses, established positive laws ef pessession and 
ewnership, it is clear that the body in society that has rightful jurisdiction 
over preperties and preperly relations must be the temperai ruler. The 
church ewns nothing and has ne rights te ewnership. Pessession as 
ewnership, is a secular and logicai conclusión that men agree te as faUen 
creatures se that they add te their naturai right ef use the specificatiens of 
as a pelemisist (e. 1329), Opus nonaginta dierum, hi OP I; chapters 2 and 3 
define terms used in varieus papal buUs against the Franciscan understanding 
ef usus, possessie, deminium etc. according te positive law, erdinary language 
and scripture (e. 4). 
Chapter 2 — en divine deminium and legai deminium, pp. 305-6 ff. On the 
petestas gubernandi et dispenendi, and the petestas utendi of the first parents, 
see OND, e. 14 , OP II, pp. 430-40; especiaUy pp. 433-5 and 439 on the petestas 
appropriandi sibi et dividendi res inter se. Quia ex dictamine ratienis naturalis 
cenvincitur qued expedit posse peccantìbus quod etiam habeant petestatem 
appropriandi sibi... Et ex isto sequitur quod Ucet domirùum ex iure positivo 
intreductum sit idem qued proprietas, deminium tamen, sì debet vecari 
deminium qued competìt absque enrmi iure positive, divino et humano, non est 
idem qued proprietas. p. 435. Unlìke Miethke, I do net thmk this is supported 
by Aristotle's Pelitics II, 2-5 (1260b-1264b) where it is discusseti whether or not 
men sheuld share wives and children and property. The expediency discovered 
by naturai reason as a result ef experience is, rather, a Cicerenian insight made 
plain Ui beth the De republica and the De Offidis. 
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preperly evmership. Priests and popes are men. Se that when they have 
any relation te property they de se under the rules ef temperai 
arrangements. The scope ef papal power is cfrcumscribed by what anyone 
can read ef in scripture, when ene reads the gespel law: there it is said 
that Christ cenferred en Peter not unlimited plenitude ef power over 
things spiritual and temperai, but rather, a limited jurisdiction te 
administer sacraments, erdafri the priestly hierarchy and instruct the 
faithful̂ ^*^ Christ did not give Peter er his feUewers jurisdiction over 
men's material survival in the werld. Men have a naturai right te arrange 
this for themselves prior te the church's institution, and they do this first, 
by knewing frem experience that they must stay aUve and have a right of 
use te things of the werld in erder te survive and thereafter, that it is 
logicaUy mere useful te set up positive laws which buUd on the naturai 
right te survive by using the werld. Hence, mere distinct property 
beundaries are estabUshed. The church has nethfrig te de with this. Right 
reason, that is, men's experiences and then their ratienal capacity te come 
te more general conclusiens abeut hew best te survive en the basis ef 
experience, leads them te estabUsh private property se that the resultant 
state, which has jurisdiction over property disputes amengst individuai 
men fri the state, is an autenemeus and even pre-Christian sphere ef 
activity. Within the temperai er material sphere ef survival and utility fer 
the community, made up of individuais, legitimacy is assured without 
<") De Unperatorem et pentificum petestatte, ed. C.K. Brampten (Oxford, 
1927): Rursum 'in temporalibus petestates plenitude' petestatem et 
dominatìonem regum gentium cemprehendit. Petestatem... Christus beato Petto 
ceterisque apestelis interdixit ut patet Lucae 22, Marci 10 et Matthaei 20. (p. 5); 
also see pp. 9-10. 
Prelegue, De imperaterem et pentificum potestate, pp. 3-4: verumtamen 
hoc certum habeant universi, qued in his quae fidei sunt et scientiae plus me 
monebit una ratio evidens vel una aucteritas scripturae sacra sane inteUigenda, 
quam assertìo tetius unìversitatis mertalium prepter quos inteUectum emnine 
debeo in eerem obsequìum captivare... Tenendum est igitur in primis, quod 
Christus beatum Pettum constituens caput et prmcipem universorum fidelium 
non dedit ei talem in temporalibus et spirìtualibus plenitudinem petestatis, ut 
omnia de iure pesset regulariter, quae neque legi divinae neque legi naturae 
refragant sed petestatì quae certos fines, quos nen deberet ttansgredi, assignavit. 
Quod enim ei temporalibus talem nen dedit plenitudinem potestatìs auctoritate 
et ratìone probatur. 
237 
REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE CIÉNCIAS SOCIAIS E HUMANAS 
reference te the church, legitimacy is assumed when the censent ef the 
govemed is ebtafried se that tìie common geed may be pursued. 
Hew is tìùs censent ef tìie govemed ebtafried fer Ockham? He sees 
ceUective opinion as a summatien ef every individual's epfrùen. He dees 
net beUeve that a coUection ef men mio a corporation er general ceundl 
somehew takes en, as fri centemperary corporation theery, a separate 
persenality which represents the members. Rather, the whole, any whole 
is a summatien ef its parts ordered te a ceUective end. Ne created legai 
entity, Uke a state, can perferm real acts. Rather, the acts of the regnum 
are the summatien ef the acts ef aU the fridividual members werkfrig 
tegether'^^. The state then, has no separate and real rights ef its ewn 
under law. Only real, autenemeus, ratienal Uidividuals are capatile of 
reneuncfrig er heldmg legai rights. Fer Ockham, a corporation and even 
a religious erder is net a legaUy created fictitieus persen with a separate 
persenality. Rather, a coUection ef men is the summatien ef the wUls of 
each and every member when ordered te an ebjective common geed. So 
when a regnum or a religious erder has established rules, these rules are 
general propesitions or statements which need te be understeed se that 
each individuai whe is cevered by the rules remains an autenemeus and 
respensible persen. The cemmunal and politicai Ufe is, therefere, made 
up ef friteractions between individuai persens ef the community. And the 
universal church is made up ef ali the individuai believers, priests, lay 
men and wemen'^^\ 
'̂ ^ Tractatus centta Benedìctum, OP III, pp. 165-322; esp. pp. 190-1. Facta 
quidem, quae singulorem sunt, persenarum veram exigunt et requirunt: ordo 
autem vera persona nen est sed repraesentata et imaginaria; quare quae factì 
sunt, sibi convenire nequeunt, Ucet ei possint congruere quae sunt iuris. (PP. 
189-91)... Ex quibus aUisque lecus Uquido censtat quod cemmunitas et multìtudo 
potest habere actum realem, et per consèquence non est persona imaginaria et 
repraesentata...Nec orde est persona misticum qued est verae persenae. (. 191)... 
et per consequens fidèles sunt una ecclesia, et ita ecclesia est verae persenae et 
nen est persona imaginaria et repraesentata. 
^̂) Tractatus centta learmem, e. 14, OP III, pp. 29-156; p 65: ...aucteritas 
ecclesiae universalis, quae etiam fidèles nen selum in hac vita simul digentes, 
sed sibimet succedentes praelatos et popules cathoUces cemprehendit, valet ad 
fidem et certitudinem catholicae veritatis... Ita veritates catholicae ab universali 
ecclesia approbantur, quando praelatì cemmuniter et pepuli, cemprehendentes 
vires et mulieres cathelicas, easdem veritates sub verbis apertis expressas 
tamquam cathelicas expresse vel tacite cenfitenter, Ucet nequaquam simul 
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Hew de cellectiens ef individuais come te agree te rules in the 
state or hi the church? Simply by experiencing the werld they live in and 
then constructfrig sentences according te language's logie te express that 
experience. If ali men use language cerrectly they will find that they 
come te the same conclusiens abeut their experiences. Each individuai 
then, is respensible fer alienating property when he Uves in a society that 
has set up private property as a determination ef the larger naturai law 
notion knewn by ali that we ali have a right ef use in the world'^^l Each 
individuai is respensible in the exercise ef his rights, his Uberties, his 
resistance te breakers ef trust, be they pepe er king. 
Sovereignty in states derives from the peeple as individuai ratienal 
members ef any community ordered te a ceUective end, and they have a 
naturai power te make laws and institute rulers. Hew do individuais 
knew they have such pewers? Ockham says we have this knewledge 
simply by experiencing that we need a govemor whem we create as a 
result ef Uving as fallen creatures in a werld where we have needs that 
must be satisfied if we are te survive. We have a naturai right te survive 
and then we conclude frem survival experiences that it is best te institute 
a regulater whe will estabUsh rules which each ef us must follow if we 
are te live successfuUy in a community ef individuais. But the temperai 
sphere which establishes positive laws, is imperfect; indeed, we would 
not need the state as it exists new had Adam and Ève net fallen, in the 
sense that we would net need the kinds ef positive laws that censfrain or 
coerce us when we act irrationaUy'^''^ Because the temperai sphere is 
imperfect, secular sovereignty may be legitimate even when tyrannical. 
This seunds edd at first, given that Ockham is se keen te estabUsh 
the respensibUity and autenemeus nature ef individuais in society. But 
he argues that once the individuai members ef the community have 
consented, veluntarUy, te create a legitimate positive authority, this pubUc 
authority can only be retracted in very extreme circumstances, as when 
the ruler commits egregieus sins er crimes'^^\ Ockham thinks that mesi 
conveniant, neque pre tribunati sedentes aliquam veritatem catholicam definiant 
esse credendam. P. 67. 
'̂ ') De imperaterum et pentificum potestate, pp. 21-2. 
'̂ °) Compare MarsiUus, Defensor Pacis, I, vi, 1 cited below. 
<̂̂* Fer example, Octe Quaestiones de potestate papae, OP I, ed. Offler, II, 
e. 4 p. 74; II, e. 5 pp. 75-6; II, e. 6, p. 76, p. 78 et passim. 
239 
REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE CIÉNCIAS SOCIAIS E HUMANAS 
rulers threughout history, net ali but most, organised society sufficiently 
in a utiUtarian manner se that whatever crimes they might have cemmitted 
were ef lesser consèquence te the weil being ef the whole than would be 
thefr remeval. Ockham sees the politicai realm as largely incapatile of 
achieving its ideals. Like MarsiUus, hewever, it can and must achieve the 
sufficient Ufe. But Ockham is willing, because he thinks mesi ratienal 
men are willing, te grant legitimate power te a severeign secular ruler or 
govemment, even when thereafter, the gevemment deprives men ef certain 
pewers er wrengly interferes against the laws with men's property, or 
invelves men in wars where they have net been censulted. Once 
established, by human law which is itself established by individuais 
censenting te specific prepesed ordinances te rule their individuai and 
ceUective behavieur, Ockham says the state must be accepted by these 
over whem it exercises its power. Se we begin with an immense initial 
power ef a coUection ef respensible individuais te censent te the crèation 
ef a pubUc authority but, thereafter, Ockham believes that once installed, 
the ruler assumes aU authority se long as his jurisdiction remains useful 
and advantageous te the survival ef the common geed. The state is not 
an envirenment fer the perfection ef individuais' Uves. Il is, as with 
Marsilius, a utilitarian crèation ef ratienal men whe have experienced 
survival and whe recegnise a need te estabUsh more general laws of 
behavieur, in erder te achieve a utiUtarian common geed. There is no 
social cenfract fer Ockham between state and citizens (although there is 
an implied cenfract between individuais te set up a third party, the 
severeign, legitimate and ceercive authority). Fer Marsilius, there is 
semething lU ê a contract between the govemment and the severeign 
peeple, in the sense that gevemment is a revecable grant ef the peeple, 
the multitude. 
The gevemment, fer Ockham, once established, can only be 
remeved in cases of the mesi extreme scandal er criminality. Ockham's 
belief m each man's individuai respensibility and reason seems te carry 
over Ulto his understandmg ef the character of most govemors whe also. 
Octe Quaestiones, III,c. 1, p. 97; III, e. 3, p. 101, III, e. 5 on the principatus as 
ene, few, many but unified. HI, e. 11, p. 113: Si tamen optimus prfricipatus, sive 
cunctorum mertalium sive aUquerum, fuerit institutus, nen est pestea sine causa 
urgentissima desttuendus, unde ex multis causis interrumpi pesset, ex quibus 
tamen desttui non valeret. 
240 
SOVEREIGNTY AND POWER RELATIONS IN THE THOUGHT OF MARSILIUS OF PADUA 
AND WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: A COMPARISON 
by and large, are ratienal fri the utilitarian sense, and respensible eneugh 
to ensure the survival ef the common geed as it is perceived by members 
or citizens of the state. 
But there is alse a negative aspect ef Ockham's understanding ef 
sovereignty m the werld. Theelegically, Ockham argues that human 
sovereignty over men and things is a result of the Fall. Lordship er 
deminium in its ceercive sense was net granted etemaUy to ali men 
accordfrig te reason'^'. We were granted use net preprietary deminium. 
But the power te ewn and rule by ceercive force was due te Adam's sui 
and once he sinned and human nature was corrupted, men experienced 
the horrers of surviving in the werld and develeped a power to use their 
logicai reason to amelierate this situation. Befere the fall, Adam and Ève 
had a perfect, even miraculeus but nenpreprietary power over ali things 
and they ruled thfrig's with reason rather than by coercien. But we are ne 
lenger Uke that. We cannet simply live peaceably with other faUen men 
whereby we only use the werld rather than set up fences areund what 
we claim is eur ev^m. After the fall then, men acquired the power te 
appropriate and divide things, a power they acquired frem experience 
with other men whe did net act ratienally ali the time as Adam and Ève 
did befere the faU. Ockham says that scripture shews us that there was 
no naturai common ewnership befere the faU, and ne such naturai common 
ownership after the fall'^\ After the fall, aU there was men's experience of 
survival and their develepment ef the power te appropriate and divide 
things. Ged dees net implant fri faUen nature a right ef ewnership. It is, 
rather, man's conclusión ef hew best te survive and this conclusión then 
establishes positive laws te regniate apprepriatien and divisien, ownership 
and pessession. Ownership and pessession is an expressien ef human 
institution, a conclusión ef fallen man's reasening frem experience which 
God simply aUews but dees not institute himself. Temperai authority, 
which accempanied property ewnership, was a consèquence of the faU 
and therefere, temperai authority is regulated by positive law rather than 
'") Por a thorough discussìen ef the medUicatien te man's powers after 
the fall, see Miethke, pp. 472-3: Man has, naturaUy, a petestas acquirendi 
dominium and net deminium itself, p. 475. 
<̂3) Opus nonaginta dierum, p. 435. Alse W. KòUnel, 'Das Naturrecht bei 
Wilhelm Ockham', Franziskanische Sttidien, 35 (1953) pp. 39-85. 
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by naturai law. Ged just lets us gel en with it, and ebserves men usfrig 
thefr reason te draw conclusiens that are expedient according te reason 
fer survival fri the new faUen werld. Hence, temperai authority, created 
by ratienal and utiUtarian men, is independent of any ecclesiastical 
sanction. The develepment ef the legitimacy ef temperai power, whatever 
the censtitution may look like, was a development common te aU men 
infidel and Christian, which Ged sanctions. Il has nothing te de with the 
institutìenal church ner with a supernatural gift ef grace frem Ged tìiat 
enables men to estabUsh the geed society. 
What we have is an extremely utilitarian and naturai develepment 
ef govemments as a consèquence ef men, new fallen, experiencing survival 
in the werld and reasening that positive laws would make it a let easier 
fer ali ef us te continue staying aUve. We have here a conclusión, reached 
in a sUghtìy difierent manner, that is simUar to that of MarsiUus ef Padua'̂ '̂. 
Marsilius says that in the very earliest ef cemmunities of men, men 
naturaUy knew that they had te come up with standards ef justice an 
equity that were ratienal te govem the whole in a manner different from 
the way heusehelds were estabUshed'^^\ For Ockham and for MarsiUus, 
these ratienal standards are the conclusiens ef individuai, ratienal men 
coming tegether and experiencing the benefits ef cemmunal life, benefìts 
that are judged in terms ef more expedient and peaceful survival and not 
in terms of man's fulfUment ef any higher nature, inteUectual er spfrituaP^. 
We need laws and rules if we are te live with ene another. It is easier to 
survive coUectively fri a community that is functienally differentiated so 
that different peeple perferm different tasks in and fer the whole 
(24) There are several earlier discussions en the relatienship between 
Marsilius and Ockham: G. de Lagarde, 'Marsile de Padoue et Guillaume 
d'Ockham'; Revue de sciences reUgieuses 17 (1937) pp. 167-85, 428-454; J. 
SuUivan, 'Marsiglie ef Padua and WiUiam of Ockham', AHR 2 (1896-7), pp. 
409-26; 593-610; J. G. Sikes, 'A pessible Marsilian Source in Ockham' EHR 51 
(1936) pp. 496-504; C. Pincin, MarsiUo (Torino, 1967); J. Miethke, Ockhams Weg 
zur SozialphUosephie (Berlin, 1969) pp. 98-106 f. 
'̂ )̂ Marsilius ef Padua, The Defensor Pacis, ed. C.W. Previté — Orton 
(Cambridge, 1928). 
DPI, ui, 3-4. 
(26) DP I, iii, 5: Demum vero quae necessaria sunt ad vivere et bene vivere, 
per heminum rationem et experientiam perducta sunt ad cemplementum, et 
242 
SOVEREIGNTY AND POWER RELATIONS IN THE THOUGHT OF MARSILIUS OF PADUA 
AND WILLIAM OF OCKHAM: A COMPARISON 
community. Ne expert teaches us that we need general rules ef justice or 
equity te govem the community ef individuai men. We simply experience 
survival and draw logicai conclusiens frem experience te the effect that 
general rules, applicable te aU, need te be established^^^. We knew what is 
morally right, what it means te be respensible fer eur actions, simply by 
knewing that we have been created as free, ratienal experiencers of the 
werld of survival. We create public autherities, the multitude ef ratienal 
men knews what it is te experience semething and then draw more 
general, ratienal conclusiens which serve peace and the sufficient life. 
Ockham cemes te this conclusión by arguing that we knew through 
experience that we are naturaUy free te make cheices, geed er bad, new 
that we are fallen, and the better cheices lead te better survival'^^). We 
express the mere general conclusiens ef eur experience in language and 
enshrine the mere general conclusiens in positive laws ef a society. 
MarsUius, net arguing specifically frem our use ef language but rather 
from eur experience ef the better quality of Uving pessible in cemmunities 
also says that men naturaUy knew intuitively that diciate ef reason that 
we need ratienal rules te govem eurselves coUectively fer peace and 
instituta est perfecta cemmunitas vecata civitas cum suarum partium 
distinctione... 
'̂ ^ DP I, V, 3: Et queniam ea quibus haec temperamenta complentur, non 
accipimus a natura omniquaque perfecte, necessarium fuit homini ultta causas 
naturales per rationem aliqua fermare, quibus cempleatur efficientia et 
conservatie suarum actienum et passionum secundum corpus et animam. DP I, 
V, 4: Actienum autem humanarum et suarum passionum quaedam preveniunt 
a causis naturalibus praeter cognitionem, quales fiunt per elementorum 
conttarietatem nostra cemponentium corpera prepter ipsorum permixtienem . 
'̂ *) Quod. I, q. 16, p. 87: Utrum possit prebabri sufficienter quod voluntas 
libere causet actus sues effective... In ista quaestìone prime expenam quid voce 
libertatem. a.l: Circa primum sciendum quod vece libertatem petestatem qua 
possum indifferenter et contingenter diversa ponere, ita qued possum eumdem 
effectum causare et non causare, nulla diversitate existente alibi extra illam 
petentiam.... Utrum pessit prebari sufficienter quod voluntas est libera... Circa 
primum dice quod nen potest prebari per aliquam rationem, quia omnia ratio 
hoc probans accipiet aeque ignetum cum conclusione vel ignetius. Petest tamen 
evidenter cognosci per experientiam per hoc quod homo experitur qued quantum 
cumque ratio dictet aliquid, potest tamen voluntas hec velie vel nen velie vel 
nelle, p. 88. 
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stabUity^^ Beth men focus on men's experience, en the fridividual, ratienal 
capacities that faUen men have, to reflect en their sensual survival 
experiences and thereby conclude mere general rules ef ceUective 
behavieur. Beth men see men as creaters ef the stmctures in which they 
are govemed; beth men see fallen man fri need ef coercien through positive 
law, especiaUy when each of us, at some time er other, centradicts 
ratienality and endangers the wellbeing of ethers. The source of 
sovereignty then is the peeple; sovereignty is a crèation ef the peeple, but 
fer Marsilius it is mere easily revecable frem these whe have been elected 
te represent us when they de se te faveur thefr ewn interest rather than 
eurs. Fer Ockham, this revecatien ef pubUc authority is pessible only in 
the rarest situatiens. 
There is semething happier, mere centent in Marsilius' regnum, 
whatever its censtitution, where the sufficient life is the cenditien of 
civiUsatien. Fer the Franciscan Ockham, whe as a religious man leeked to 
a higher fulfilment ef the human spirit, gevemment is a ratienal necessary 
evU because were men net fallen, they would not be thinking abeut acting 
en their abiUty te acquire deminium and they would not censider ewnfrig 
the werld and dividing up pessessions te exclude ethers. They would 
live by the naturai law of use ef things ef the werld, live in harmony with 
the naturai order and, like the mesi spiritual Franciscans, care nothing for 
private deminium fri the werld. But these are ideals weil beyend the 
peUtical fer Ockham. Pelitics is a ratienal conclusión of men te govem in 
an erderly manner their mede ef surviving. It simply happens te be a 
conclusión ef reason that survival in the werld is made easier by a rightful 
and stable divisien ef pessessions. This is tee bad, says Ockham. But that 
is hew it new is. Gevemment is sanctiened by God whe nermally watches 
US draw conclusiens rationaUy frem eur experiences. Hew geed it would 
be had we never fallen and therefere never cencluded that survival 
requires private property. Gevemment would be ratienal rather than 
expedient and ceercive. But that is net hew it is, and hew it is, is 
acknewledged by Ged but net fristituted by him. Every reader ef scripture 
(29) DP I, Iii, 4. Compare Cicero, De Officiis, I, iv, U, as cited by MarsUius, 
DP I, iv, 2. 'Principio generi animantium omnia natura tributum est, ut se, 
corpus, vitamque tueaturm declinet ea quae necitura videantur, omnia quae 
necessaria sunt ad vìvendum acqufrat et paret? Qued etaUn ex mductiene sensata 
palam quiUbet accipere potest. 
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knew this, says Ockham. It is none ef the business ef the church either te 
sanction temperai govemment er te frivelve itseU in private property 
relations. The church's property, as fer Marsilius, is ewned by the state 
and the ecclesiastical hierarchy is merely an administiator of wealth fer 
charitable purpeses fri human society. The church is there te help men 
noncoercively te attaUi heaven. Fer Ockham it has ne purpese other than 
the service ef individuais. It is net there fer itself ner fer its ewn survival 
as an institution. 
It says in scripture that the pepe, that is Peter, was te provide only 
these things necessary fer the Christian quest fer etemal salvatien. The 
determination ef what is necessary te this end is net te be judged by the 
pope. Rather, it is a decisien ef clergy and lay men and wemen, whether 
poor, rich, subjects er rulers, a decisien they come te when they read and 
interpret scripture legicaUy, grammatically and ratienally. The message 
is there. Papal power is not unlimited, and the pope dees net have a 
plenitude of power in the werld. We knew this by reading scripture and 
what we alse knew frem experience is cenfirmed in scripture: that Christ's 
law is a law ef liberty. There we see that men have a Uberty te make 
choices, that they have a naturai right te survive by using God's werld 
and that after the fall men cencluded ratienally te estabUsh positive laws 
to survive coUectively. The pepe cannet take away such Uberties from 
any man, Christian er nen Christian. Hely Scripture, says Ockham, 
describes men's custems, which they established from their experience, 
and he insists that these custems may be daily verified<^> by any person's 
experience ef what it means te survive and hew best te survive coUectively, 
The pepe's arguments are therefere net accurate, logicai, ratienal readings 
of scripture but based interprètations te flaveur his ewn survival rather 
than that ef the community of Christians'^^^ 
'3") Epistola ad Fratres mineres, OP III p. 17. Nam sanctarum regulas 
scripturarum meres heminum describentes, dum quetidie per experientiam 
verificari censpicìe, magis intellìge. 
'3̂ ) Ibid., OP III, p. 6. quamplura haeretìcaUa, stulta, ridiculosa, fantastica, 
insana et diffamatoria, fidei orthodexeae, benis meribus, ratieni naturali, 
experientìae certae et caritati fratemae contraria pariter et adversa patenter 
inveni. Hence questions ef the faith are te be decided ...non selum ad generale 
conciUum aut prelates vel etiam clericos, verum etiam ad laicos et ad omnes 
omnino pertment christianos (citing Decretum C. 4 d. 96 "Ubmam": quod omnes 
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Ockham is not sayfrig that any ef eur experiences of the werid 
would lead us te discever the decfrme of the frmity er other mysteries of 
the faith'32) These decfrfries tìie church must teach se that men might 
have faith fri that which is beyend their experience. But we de net need 
the church, says Ockham, te teach us that we are meral and ratienal 
beings. MeraUty and mles ef equity fri society are ratienal cendusiens of 
aU humans based en their experiences ef relations between fridividuals^^^. 
We knew, as MarsiUus also says we knew, certain basic meral precepts 
abeut survival and what is required if we conclude, as we de, that it is 
mere peaceful and utUitarian te survive fri common and coUectively. States 
are therefere, fer beth thfrikers, ethical sfructure that we create because 
we conclude that they are the mesi ratienal ways ef surviving. 
What is fundamental te MarsiUus, Ockham and frideed te aU ef the 
peUtical decfrUies frifluenced by Aristotle and Cicero frem the later 13th 
century enwards, is that men are ratienal and meral fridividuals whether 
they alse happen te be Christians er net. The state, whatever its 
censtitution may look like, is neither a consèquence of Christianity ner is 
it in need ef Christianity's sanction. With these decfrines, preving the 
autenemy of the state and its crèation by fallen but ratienal men for 
utilitarian purpeses, we effectively enter the early modem peried. 
Ockham's theery ef hew gevemment cemes te be implemented is 
a somewhat mere general theery ef sovereignty than that ef MarsiUus. 
This is partly because Ockham dees net confirm his theery by taking as 
his model any particular, de facto gevemment in the werld as MarsUius 
dees when he appeals te the examples ef the regnum ItaUcum made up 
tangit ab omnibus ttactari debet... Ex quibus colUgetur evidenter quod questìo 
fidei etìam ad mulieres spectat catholicae et fidèles. p. 10. 
'32) Qued. II, q. 3, pp. 117-18, and 120-22. 
'33) Qued II, q. 14, p. 176: scientìa non positìva est illa quae sine omni 
praecepte superieris dirigit actus humanos: sicut principia per se nota vel nota 
per experientia sic dirigunt, sicut quod omne henestum est faciendum... 
disciplina moralis non positìva est scientìa demenstratìva, (where conclusiens 
are deduced syUegistically from principies that are either per se nota vel per 
experientiam scitis.) p. 178. Et ultta dico quod ista scientia est certier multìs 
aUis, pre quanto quiUbet potest habere maierem experientiam de actibus suis 
quam de aliis. Ex quo patet quod ista scientia est multum subtilis, utiUs et 
evidens. 
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of northem ItaUan seU-geveming cities under the general regulatUig watch 
of the Hely Roman Emperer. Ockham's theery issues frem a mere 
phUosophical cencem for the nature ef the individual's capacities over 
the werld wherever and whenever he may be Uving. But beth men place 
an enormeus emphasis en the human capacity te reason frem experience 
to more general cenclusiens'^>. In other werds, beth men are influenced 
by the Aristotelian argument that men come te mere general conclusiens 
by means of induction. What is very impertant in these fourteenth-century 
texts is the relè they give te men's experience ef the werld and, indeed, 
the cenfidence they have in men being able te create ratienal stiuctures 
based on the certainty ef thefr sensual experiences ef Uving. Marsilius is 
more specifically AristeteUan when he says that he wahts te define the 
state er regnum as that kfrid ef temperate regime, whether ruled over by 
one, several er many, that has semething specific te it: and that semething 
is the peeple, the multitude, which is common te ali legitimate states 
because the multitude is the source ef severeignty'^^^ Laws, rules ef 
behavieur, are the logicai and ratienal censèquences not ef impesition 
from on high; they derive frem what the multitude thinks best for the 
community'^^. 
<3*) DPI,v,3. 
(36) Qp j^ ^̂ ^ 2: In this hook we are censidering the causes and actions by 
which the ruling part must, in most cases, be established. First hewever, we 
wish te indicate the methed and cause by which this part has been established 
in the past, although rarely (Ucet rare) in erder te distinguish this methed and 
action and its immediate cause, from these by which the gevemment must 
regularly and in most cases (regulariter et in pluribus creari debet) be established 
and which we can prove by human demonstratien. Fer of the former methed 
no certain cemprehension can be had through demensttatìen (prieris enim medi 
per demenstratìonem certa comprehensie nequit haberi). This methed or action 
with its immediate cause... was the divine will... with respect to this cause and 
its free actìon... we can say nothing through demenstratìen, but we held it by 
simple belief apart from reason. (nec sic esse aut fuisse factum, per 
demensttatìonem nec quicquam dicere possumus, sed simpUci creduUtate absque 
ratìone tenemus). There is, hewever, another methed of estabUshing govemments 
which proceeds immediately frem the human mind although perhaps remetely 
from Ged as remete cause... Hewever, God dees net always act immediately, 
indeed in most cases (qued tamen nen est immediate semper, quinime ut in 
pluribus et ubique quasi hos statuii per heminum mentes, quibus talis 
instìtutìonis concessit arbittium) nearly everywhere, he establishes goverrunents 
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MarsUius, Uke other centemperary cemmentaters en Aristetìe, is 
cencemed te demenstrate just why Aristetìe is cerrect in saying that the 
multitude, and net experts, sheuld rule and be invelved in office as citizen 
with judicial functìons^^ .̂ Even where those representatives whe are the 
by means ef human mìnds te which he has granted the discretienary wiU for 
such establishment. This ...can be indicateti with human certainty (per humanam 
certitudinem assignari) from what is better or werse fer the pelity. 
(37) ]3p j ŷ  i- dicamus qued partes sue officia civitatis sunt sex generum 
(foUewing Aristotle Pel. VII, 7): agricultura, artifìcium, militaris, pecuniatìva, 
sacerdetium et iudicialis seu censilìativa. Quorum ttìa, videlicet sacerdetium, 
prepugnativa et iudicialis, simpliciter sunt partes civitatis quas etiam in 
communitatibus cìvilibus henerabilitatem dicere solent. Reliqua vero dicuntur 
partes large, ut quìa sunt officia necessaria Civita ti... et solet horum multitudo 
dici vulgaris. 
LP I, xi, 3: The making ef laws requires prudence... and prudence requires 
long experience. (Citing Aristotle, Politics II, 2 and Rheteric I and Ethics)... The 
cause is that prudence is ef singular things which beceme knewn through 
experience. Censequently what one man alone can discever er knew by himself 
beth in the science of civil justice and benefit and other sciences, is little or 
nothing... But when a coUection (ef men) is made from ameng ali whe have 
achieved some cemprehension what is coUected wfll be ef censiderable quality... 
Cum igitur lex sit eculus ex multis eculis id est cemprehension examinata ex 
multìs cemprehenseribus. Also DPI, xu, 2. It can pertain to any citizen to discover 
the law taken materiaUy in its third sense as the science of civil justice and 
benefit. Such inquiry hewever can be carried eut mere apprepriately and be 
compieteti better by these men whe are able te have leisure... (scientìam 
iusterum... invenire petest ad quemlìbet civem pertìnere, Ucet inquisitìe haec 
cenvenientìus fieri possit et cempleri melius ex observatìone potentìum vacare, 
serùerum et expertorum)... verum quia cognitìo seu inventìo vera iusterum et 
conferentium ac suerum eppositerum nen est lex secundum ultimam 
sigiùfìcatìene et propriam, qua sit mensura humanorum actum civìUum, nisi 
dum de ipsius observatìone praeceptum coactivum datum fuerit, and experts 
and prudent men alene de not have the authority te issue ceercive cemmands. 
DP I, xii, 5: Queniam ilUus tantummedo est legum humanarum lationis seu 
instìtutìonis aucteritas humana prima simpliciter, a que selum eptìmae leges 
possunt prevenire. Hec etìm est civium universitas aut eius pars valentìor, 
quae tetam universitatem repraesentat... Secundam vere prepositìonem probo, 
videUcet quod ex universae multìtudinis auditu et precepto tantummedo feratur 
lex eptìma. Hoc autem fieri eptime per civium universitatem tantummedo, aut 
eius valentìerem partem qued prò eedem de cetero supponatur. He bases his 
proof en the premise that every corporeal whe is greater in mass and in virtue 
than any part ef it taken separately. Hence, the common utility of a law is 
better noted by the entire multìtude. 
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weightìer part ef the community participate mere expUcitly in office 
holdùig, they de se as representatives ef the ratienal multitude's wUl. 
The multitude cemprises, he says, aU men whe are net defermed naturaUy 
and whe therefere desfre the sufficient Ufe. He demonsfrates through 
induction that men free what is harmful and seek what is beneficiai'^). AU 
men conclude this frem the experience ef thefr five senses. It is net a 
conclusión ef absfract reason. This can also be demensfrated legicaUy, he 
says. From sense experience and frem logicai demensfratien the same 
conclusión emerges. Ockham beUeved this tee. The ratienal multitude, 
wishing te live the geed life, cendudes that this requires the civil 
community. Hence the regnum is estabUshed by the human legislater 
and he defines this as the minds and wills ef men through thefr thoughts 
and desfres, individually and coUectively. 
Where MarsiUus differs from Ockham is that MarsiUus is cenvinced 
by corporation theory. He serieusly believes that a coUected greup ef 
peeple can be represented by the voice ef one man er several, that a 
reprèsentative can accurately mirrer the ceUective wUl ef a community'̂ ^^ 
Marsilius' erganically censtituted community can, therefere, be 
hierarchicaUy arranged where the maier et sanior pars er the valentior 
pars can represent the ceUective will ef the peeple er citizen body on 
majeritarian principies, and efficiently make er change the laws. His 
human legislater can be the whole body ef the peeple, er mere narrowly 
the citizens or even mere narrowly the valentior pars whe censtitute the 
efficient cause ef the cemmunity's law. The human legislater, whether ali 
peeple or thefr delegated representatives te whem is entrusted law making, 
through its electien er wiU expressed by werds in the general assembly ef 
citizens, cemmands er determines that semething be dene er emitted 
regarding human civil acts under temperai pain er punishment^*°l 
Delegated representatives de net legislate as they think best but rather, 
they voice the will ef the whole te which the whole censents. Te 
'38) Citing Cicero De Officus. DP. I, iv, 2. 
'3') DP I, xU, passim; I xUi, 2: With these manìfest ttuths I again assume 
that common cenceptien ef the mmd that 'every whole is greater than its parts'. 
See the discussìen m Jeannine Quillet, 'Community, counsel and reprèsentatien', 
in J. H. Burns, ed. The Cambridge History ef Medieval PeUtical Thought 
(Cambridge, 1988) especiaUy pp. 558 f, fer a slightly different account. 
<*°> DPI, xii, 3. 
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representatives law-making is entrusted, but in the abselute sense, 
MarsUius says, such representatives are net the primary human legislater. 
Their authority cemes frem the peeple censtituting the civU community 
ef a temperate regime. The netables ef weightier rank speak the same 
will as the vulgus. Honorabilitas can bring civic office but their rank dees 
net mean they express a cemmunal will that is different frem the wiU of 
these whe de net held office. 
Ockham has ne such theery ef reprèsentatien. Ockham believes 
that groups ef men de net have a single voice; groups of men speak 
through the veices ef the individuais of which they are cemprised. The 
common geed, for Ockham, is the sum ef individuai conceptiens ef the 
common geed ef each and every member ef the community. Marsilius 
cemes te the common geed through majority opinion. Fer Ockham, the 
opinion of the community must be unanimous, every ene agreeing with 
the conclusiens ef everyone else. This, of course, sound unreaUstic if not 
ridiculeus. But the reason Ockham beUeves that a community ef men wiU 
cemprise lets ef individuai men ali agreeing te the same thfrig, aU 
cencluding the same thing from their experiences abeut what is in their 
ceUective friterest, is that he thinks that tìiere is a smgle, ratienal way of 
arguUig abeut anything. When peeple disagree with ene another it is 
simply that they either empley differfrig medi lequendi er that some 
have argued mere legicaUy than ethers and the mere logicai conclusión is 
the cerrect ene. Ideally the most ratienal community, fer Ockham, is one 
where everyone is legicaUy meticuleus as te hew he concludes more 
generaUy frem his fridividual experiences abeut tìie common geed fer tìie 
whole. Certainly fer him, the pepe is net any mere careful legicaUy than 
anyone else; frideed, he shews the fourteenth-century papacy te have 
misused texts and argued iUegicaUy to what are fundamentaUy irratienal 
and illogical conclusiens. 
Beth Marsilius and Ockham agree that ne matter hew simple some 
men may be, fri so far as they are ratienal they can draw the same 
unchangfrig logicai conclusión from thefr lived experiences in order to 
come up with tìie virtually unanimous agreement tìiat it is best fer men 
te Uve fri law-gevemed society, where men fristitiate regulators of that 
law over themselves. MarsUius says this expUcitìy when he notes that it 
says fri Ecclesiastes that the number of the stupid is frifinite<*^>. On tìie 
<*') DP I, xii, 4 and 5. DP, xui, 6: Por the assembled multitude ef aU ef these 
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confrary, he says, men are net that stupid sUice aU citizens which that law 
which cenduces te the survival and common benefit ef the community be 
estabUshed. Those whe de net wish the regnum te endure are slaves not 
citizefr*^̂  And, he says, it is impossible fer there te be se many persens in 
the regnum net carfrig te live a civil life that they would be a majority. 
Otherwise nature would have erred. Hence aU er most men, net simply 
the valentior pars, are of sound mfrid and reason and have a right desire 
for the pelity and fer the things necessary fer it te endure, Uke laws, 
statutes and customs^^^. WhUe net everyone is a disceverer ef the law, yet 
everyone is a judge ef what has been discovered and prepesed and sheuld 
be numbered ameng geed men. 
Beth MarsiUus and Ockham, then, agree with Cicero whe argued 
that men de net need te be tanghi except by their ewn experiences that 
they are net bem self-interested alene. Men are bem te survive and after 
living with ethers they ceritlude that it is ratienal te set up equitable 
systems se that the common utUity wiU be served and you and your 
friends wiU survive more easUy and safely. Where Ockham is mere ready 
to accept the arbitrary authority ef a ratienal severeign, once instituted 
by the censent ef individuais, MarsUius disagrees because he seems te 
think that power corrupts even ratienal and men se that they come to 
serve private interest rather than the common geed<* l̂ 
MarsiUus says that even in early secieties a single ruler ef a primitive 
vUlage community would knew that he ruled this community by means 
of an almest instinctive appeal te a common dictate ef reason possessed 
can discern and desire the common justice and benefit te a greater extent than 
can any part of that multìtude taken separately, hewever prudent that part may 
be... 7...Ner sheuld the latter (multitude) be called undisceming because they 
cannet discover such principies (ef the sciences, the arts, etc.) by themselves: on 
the conttary, they sheuld be numbered ameng geed men. 
<«' DPI,xiiì,2. 
'*3) DP I, xiU, 3: For most ef the citìzens are neither vicieus ner undisceming 
most of the time: aU or most of them are ef sound mmd and reason... Hence... 
if what is meant (in the ebjectien) is that because most of the citìzens carmet 
discover the law by themselves therefere they eught not to estabUsh the law, 
this must be denied as manifestly false, as is berne eut by sense mductìen and 
by Aristotìe's Politics. 
<*> DPI,xi,l-3. 
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by aU men''*^̂  According to MarsiUus ene is net the head ef a community 
in erder te decide en cemmunal difficulties according te private whim 
and pleasure but rather, according te a certafri equitity ewed te human 
society. Early cemmunities ne less than present enes were net mled 
arbifrarily because, as a result ef experience ef livfrig mere easUy in groups 
ef men cencluded naturaUy that a standard ef equity must be established 
fer aU men in that community. Marsilius beUeves that it is a cemmenly 
held ratienal dictate that equity must be dene te aU fer the sake ef the 
common geed. Il is net only legai experts whe knew this. We ali knew 
this naturaUy and through the experience ef Uving in cemmunities. Nature 
initiated the functienal, utilitarian divisien ef labeur ameng men of 
different abilities, after the faU, and men must rationaUy and logicaUy 
complete this functienal differentiatien in the regnum. 
Beth fer Ockham and MarsiUus, aU men whe are sane, but fallen'^', 
desfre the sufficient Ufe and they come te conclusiens as to hew te estabUsh 
this sufficiency by experiencing survival and cencluding that civil 
cemmunities need to be created by them te achieve this sufficiency. Of 
course, beth men are pelemicists and in the pay of the Hely Roman 
Emperer. Of course they want to find ways te argue that the church has 
ne relè te play in the secular gevemance of men. But they do se not by 
citing secular autherities but by appealing te the lived experience of 
ratienal men whe create the werld that they deem to be mesi suitable for 
living in. 
This fraditien ef argument, shared by MarsiUus and Ockham, was 
whelly oppesed te another exfremely powerful mede of argument that 
derived frem a medieval friterpretatien ef St. Augustine and which argued 
that ratienal secieties ef men must be sanctiened by a higher, franscendent 
spiritual power fri the persen ef the pepe. The debate between these two 
'̂ 5) DP I, iU, 4 and 5. Compare Ockham en the ius poli = aequitas naturaUs. 
Opus nonaginta dierum, e. 65, p, 574. Ius autem poli vecatur aequitas naturalis, 
quae absque omni ordinatione humana et etiam divina pure positiva est consona 
ratieni rectae-sive sit consona ratieni rectae pure naturati, sive sit consena ratìoni 
rectae acceptae ex illis, que sunt nobis divinitus revelatae. 
'*̂ ) Marsilius notes sinùlarly, LP I, vi, 1. If Adam had remained in this 
status (of originai innocence er justìce and alse ef grace) the establishment or 
differentìatìon ef civU effices would not have been necessary... In quo sìquidem 
permansisset, nec sibi aut suae pesteritatì necessaria fuisset officiorum civilium 
instìtute vel dìstìnctìo. 
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ttaditìons would continue weil inte the sixteenth century and beyend. It 
was a debate abeut hew men knew the fruth abeut social Uvfrig: either it 
is autheritatively revealed, er it is cencluded frem lived experience. 
MarsiUus's and Ockham's emphasis en ratienal conclusiens drawn from 
individuai men's Uved experiences was the major aspect ef their legacy te 
the 17th century theery and pràctice ef beth popular and parliamentary 
sovereignty. Where Ockham's arguments would lead te these ef Hobbes, 
MarsUius' would lead to Locke and Rousseau. 
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